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Abstract
Inspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian
growth model of distance to frontier in which economic growth in
the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as
imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through foreign direct
investment. We show that optimal IPR protection is stage-dependent.
At an early stage of development, the country implements weak IPR
protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development,
the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic
innovation. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that supports this
theoretical nding
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1 Introduction
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the implementation of a modern intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) system in China was subject to intense debates.1
Proponents including Deng Xiaopeng, the Paramount leader of China at
that time, saw the creation of a modern IPR system in China as a necessary
means to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to provide incentives
for domestic innovation. In 1982, the rst intellectual property law under the
leadership of Deng was drafted in China. Then, through a series of policy
reforms, the strength of patent rights in China increased overtime. For ex-
ample, the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights in China gradually increased
from 1.33 in 1985 to 4.08 in 2005.2 In 1992, the statutory term of patent in
China was lengthened from 15 years to 20 years.3 Then, in compliance with
1See for example Allison and Lin (1999) and La Croix and Konan (2002) for a discussion
on the historical evolution of IPR in China.
2The Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number implies stronger
patent rights. See Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008a) for a detailed description of
this patent index.
3As for the term of patent for utility model and design patents, it was lengthened from
5 years to 10 years. Also, this patent reform expanded patentable subject matter in China.
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the TRIPS agreement,4 China reformed its patent system again in 2000.5
Recently, the Third Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law was approved
in December 2008 and came into e¤ect in October 2009 with the objective
of building China into an innovative country with well-protected IPR by
2020.6 In addition to strengthening patent rights, China also improved the
protection for trade secrets by developing a comprehensive set of laws and
regulations over the last two decades.7 In a recent report issued by NERA
Economic Consulting, Sepetys and Cox (2009, p. 3) nicely summarize the
evolution of IPR in China as follows.
In the early stages of development, with limited resources and
limited capacity for research and development, there may be lit-
tle or no IPR protection. Domestic industry will be character-
4The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
is an agreement of the World Trade Organization. In summary, TRIPS establishes a
minimum level of IPR protection that must be provided by all member countries.
5The policy changes include (a) providing patentholders with the right to obtain a
preliminary injunction against the infringing party before ling a lawsuit, (b) stipulating
standards to compute statutory damages, (c) a¢ rming that state and non-state enterprises
enjoy equal patent rights, and (d) simplifying the patent application process, examination
and transfer procedures and unifying the appeal system. See for example Hu and Je¤erson
(2009) for an empirical analysis on this patent reform in China.
6See for example Yang and Yen (2010) for a review of the policy changes in this third
amendment. In summary, the changes aim at (a) promoting patent applications, (b) en-
couraging exploitation of jointly owned patents, (c) heightening patentability requirement,
(d) increasing statutory damages and administrative nes, (e) clarifying the granting of
compulsory licenses, and (f) establishing protection for genetic resources.
7See for example Zuber (2008) for a discussion on the protection of trade secrets in
China and the US.
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ized by imitation rather than innovation. Imitation allows for
low-cost production, low prices for goods and services, and the
stimulation of consumption and employment. A weak IPR regime
may support technological growth and development through im-
itation in early stages of development. At subsequent stages of
development, however, a weak IPR regime discourages domestic
innovation. Innovation and technological development are drivers
of economic growth. Economies that succeed in shifting into
knowledge-based production are characterized by domestic in-
novation, typically supported with well-designed and adequately
enforced IPR laws.
In this study, we develop a growth-theoretic model to formalize this in-
sight on the evolution of IPR in developing countries using China as a timely
example. For example, one objective of Chinas twelfth ve-year plan (2011-
2015) is to shift its reliance on foreign technology to domestic innovation.
To analyze stage-dependent IPR for a developing country at di¤erent stages
of development, we consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to
frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by
domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies
through FDI. We show that the model features an inverted-U e¤ect of patent
strength on domestic innovation under a certain parameter space. The intu-
ition is as follows. On the one hand, increasing patent strength has a direct
positive e¤ect on domestic innovation by reducing imitation. On the other
hand, the reduction in imitation leads to an increase in FDI that strengthens
the displacement e¤ect of foreign technologies on domestic innovation. As for
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the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing strengths of IPR protection,
we show that they are stage-dependent. At an early stage of development,
the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation of for-
eign technologies. At a later stage of development, the country implements
strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. Therefore, the op-
timal strength of IPR protection increases as the country develops towards
the world technology frontier as in the case of China. Finally, we also pro-
vide cross-country empirical evidence based on panel data to support our
theoretical nding.
This study relates to the literature on IPR and economic growth. This
literature focuses on an important issue that is optimal IPR protection. An
early study by Nordhaus (1969) nds that the optimal patent length should
balance between static distortionary e¤ects of markup pricing and dynamic
gains from enhanced innovation. In a dynamic general-equilibrium model,
Judd (1985) nds that the optimal patent length is innite while Iwaisako
and Futagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) nd that the op-
timal patent length can be nite in a version of the Romer model. Kwan
and Lai (2003) show that extending the e¤ective lifetime of patent would
lead to a substantial increase in R&D and welfare whereas Li (2001) and
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) consider the e¤ects of patent breadth
on R&D and economic growth. Recently, Chu (2009) analyzes the e¤ects
of blocking patents on R&D and welfare. However, this literature rarely
considers optimal IPR protection in developing countries in which economic
growth is driven by imitation and transfer of foreign technologies in addition
to domestic innovation. We ll this gap in the literature by analyzing the
5
optimal strength of IPR protection in a developing country at di¤erent stages
of economic development.
Our study also relates to the literature on IPR and North-South product
cycles.8 A key question in this literature is whether strengthening South-
ern IPR protection would stimulate or stie Northern innovation. Grossman
and Helpman (1991) develop a North-South product-cycle model and nd
that strengthening Southern IPR protection either has no e¤ect or a sur-
prisingly negative e¤ect on Northern innovation.9 Lai (1998) shows that
whether Southern IPR protection has a positive or negative e¤ect on North-
ern innovation depends on the mode of technology transfer (i.e., imitation
versus FDI) while Glass and Wu (2007) argue that the e¤ect also depends on
the type of technological innovation (i.e., quality improvement versus variety
expansion). Instead of analyzing the e¤ects of Southern IPR protection on
Northern innovation, the present study considers a much less explored issue
that is optimal IPR protection in the South as a function of its technology
distance from the North.
An inuential study by Grossman and Lai (2004) considers globally op-
timal IPR protection in an open-economy model featuring both developed
and developing countries that have asymmetric innovative capability and
market size. The present study di¤ers from Grossman and Lai (2004) by
considering a model in which (a) economic growth in the developing country
8See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991), Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang
and Maskus (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002a, 2002b), Glass and Wu (2007), Tanaka et al.
(2007), Parello (2008) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010).
9Grossman and Helpman (1991) consider a tax (subsidy) on imitation that decreases
(increases) Southern imitation, which is similar to the e¤ects of IPR protection.
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is driven by both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer and
(b) the relative importance of innovation and technology transfer changes
endogenously as the country evolves towards the world technology frontier.
These two features together imply that optimal IPR protection should be
stage-dependent, which is an important property that is absent in all the
abovementioned studies.
Finally, this study relates to the literature on distance to frontier and
convergence; see for example Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al.
(2005) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). Our study relates to this lit-
erature by considering IPR as a specic economic institution and shows that
IPR policy can be an important policy variable that a¤ects the convergence
of developing countries. Finally, our study relates to a recent study by Wu
(2010), who also considers the e¤ects of IPR protection on the convergence
of developing countries using a Schumpeterian model of distance to fron-
tier. While Wu (2010) focuses on the existence of non-convergence traps, our
study di¤ers from his interesting analysis by characterizing the optimal path
of IPR protection in developing countries and considering multiple channels
of foreign technology transfer through FDI and imitation.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model. Section 3 characterizes stage-dependent IPR protection.
Section 4 presents the empirical evidence. The nal section concludes with
a discussion.
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2 A simple model of distance to frontier
We consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier.10 The
discrete-time model has four components (a) individuals, (b) nal goods, (c)
intermediate goods, and (d) R&D. In each period, there is a unit continuum
of risk-neutral individuals indexed by j. Each individual j lives for one
period, supplies one unit of labor and consumes nal goods to maximize
expected utility ujt = E[c
j
t ], where c
j
t denotes consumption by individual j.
11
Labor supply is used as an input for nal goods, which can be consumed
by individuals, devoted to various types of R&D activities or used as an
input for intermediate goods. To model the e¤ects of IPR, we consider a
specic IPR parameter t that captures the e¤ects of patent protection on
imitation, which in turn a¤ects FDI and innovation. This setup captures the
main concerns of policymakers in China.
A key di¤erence between our model and the models in Acemoglu et al.
(2003, 2006) and Wu (2010) is in our formulation of the interaction between
imitation of foreign technologies and domestic innovation in the developing
country. In previous studies, imitation and innovation in an industry are
assumed to be performed by the same rm implying that the interaction
between imitation and innovation lies in the resource allocation across the
two types of activities within a rm. In contrast, in our model, imitation and
10Our model borrows many elements from other Schumpeterian models of distance to
frontier, such as Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005) and Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
11Considering overlapping generations of households would not change our results so long
as the utility function is linear, which allows for a simple aggregation of social welfare.
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innovation in an industry are performed by two di¤erent rms capturing the
realistic scenario in which domestic innovation in the developing country can
be displaced by the importation of more advanced foreign technologies. In
other words, our framework captures both the positive spillover e¤ect and the
negative market-stealing e¤ect of foreign technologies on domestic innovation
commonly discussed in the empirical literature on technology di¤usion.12
Another key di¤erence is that we take into consideration two channels of
foreign technology transfer (a) FDI and (b) imitation. Within this frame-
work, a stronger patent system makes imitation of foreign technologies more
di¢ cult. Consequently, the lower intensity of imitation improves the incen-
tives for technology transfer via FDI, and this theoretical nding is consistent
with empirical evidence.13 As for the e¤ects of stronger patent protection on
domestic innovation, there are a direct positive e¤ect from the decrease in
imitation and an indirect negative e¤ect from the increase in FDI (i.e., the
displacement e¤ect of foreign technologies on domestic innovation). There-
fore, our model features an inverted-U e¤ect of patent strength on domestic
innovation that has been documented in recent empirical studies, such as
Lerner (2009) and Qian (2007).14
12See for example Aitken and Harrison (1999).
13An early study by Lee and Manseld (1996) nds a positive e¤ect of IPR on FDI.
Although subsequent studies produce mixed results, recent empirical studies tend to nd a
positive e¤ect. For example, Javorcik (2004) nds that IPR has a positive e¤ect on FDI in
technology-intensive sectors of transition economies. Considering a more comprehensive
set of countries, Branstetter et al. (2006) also nd that strengthening IPR has a positive
e¤ect on technology transfer.
14See also Akiyama and Furukawa (2009), Furukawa (2007, 2010) and Horii and Iwaisako
(2007), who derive an inverted-U relationship between patent strength and innovation in
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In the model, we consider a specic sequence of actions by domestic inno-
vators, foreign rms and domestic imitators. In particular, we assume that
domestic innovation is followed by FDI and then imitation. This specic
sequence of actions gives rise to the two important and realistic implications
discussed above. First, domestic innovation may be displaced by foreign tech-
nologies. Second, a strengthening of patent protection that reduces imita-
tion may encourage both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer
supporting the abovementioned rationales for implementing a modern IPR
system in China.
Finally, as in previous studies, we assume that there is no trade in factors
of production and the developing country takes the world technology frontier
as given.15 A slight modication from previous studies is that we allow for
trade in nal goods, so that foreign rms that perform FDI can retrieve their
monopolistic prots out of the developing country.
2.1 Final goods
This sector is perfectly competitive, and rms take the output and input
prices as given. Final goods Yt (chosen as the numeraire) are produced by
combining labor input with a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermedi-
ate goods Xt(i) indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. We consider a standard production
function.
Yt = L
1 
t
Z 1
0
A1 t (i)X

t (i)di

, (1)
the R&D-based growth model via other mechanisms.
15See Section 5 for a discussion on this assumption.
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where At(i) is the level of technology associated with Xt(i). The supply of
labor Lt is normalized to unity for all t. The conditional demand function
for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) = At(i) (=Pt(i))
1=(1 ) , (2)
where Pt(i) is the price of Xt(i) for i 2 [0; 1].
2.2 Intermediate goods and domestic innovation
There is a unit continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i 2 [0; 1], and
each industry i is dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader. In each in-
dustry, an individual is randomly chosen as the entrepreneur, who is given the
opportunity to innovate at the beginning of the period and potentially dom-
inate the industry for the remaining period. In the next period, all relevant
patents expire and the monopolistic position will be randomly assigned to
another entrepreneur who performs the next innovation. This simple setup,
which is in line with other Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, sim-
plies the model by equating the return to R&D to the monopolistic prot
in the current period, and this simplication allows us to focus on the dy-
namic aspects of distance to frontier. For each monopolist, producing one
unit of intermediate goods requires one unit of nal goods. The familiar
prot-maximizing price is Pt(i) = 1=. Therefore, using (2), we can derive
the amount of monopolistic prot as
t(i) = Pt(i)Xt(i) Xt(i) = At(i), (3)
where   (1  )(1+)=(1 ) is a composite parameter.
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At the beginning of time t, the level of productivity in industry i isAt 1(i).
An entrepreneur is given the opportunity to increase the level of productivity
to eAt(i) = (1+t)At 1(i), where t is a choice variable. The expected return
to innovation in industry i is (1  pt)[ eAt(i) At 1(i)] = (1  pt)tAt 1(i),
where pt 2 [0; 1] is the endogenous probability (to be derived below) that
the monopolistic position will be taken away either by a foreign rm or
by a domestic imitator before production in this period begins. When this
probability pt is high, the entrepreneur only has a small chance of capturing
the monopolistic prot and hence has less incentives to do R&D. This setup
relates to the idea of intellectual appropriability discussed in Cozzi (2001) and
Cozzi and Spinesi (2006). Under this interpretation, pt can be viewed as the
probability that the monopolistic position is stolen by another entrepreneur
before the innovator manages to start production.
To increase the level of technology by a step size of t in industry i, the
entrepreneur has to devote Rt(i) units of nal goods to R&D. We consider a
simple convex cost function given by
Rt(i) =
(t)


At 1(i), (4)
where  is a productivity parameter and  > 2.16 In (4), the scaling by
At 1(i) is common in the literature to capture increasing di¢ culty in in-
novation and to ensure a stationary t on the balanced-growth path. The
expected prot of R&D is (1  pt)tAt 1(i)  Rt(i). Simple di¤erentiation
yields the equilibrium step size of innovation given by
t = [(1  pt)]1=( 1) (5)
16This parameter assumption  > 2 ensures that the equilibrium growth rate is concave
in pt, so that the growth-maximizing level of patent protection is an interior solution.
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for i 2 [0; 1]. Equation (5) shows that an increase in pt reduces the incentives
for innovation and decreases t.
Proposition 1 Weaker intellectual appropriability (i.e., a larger pt) decreases
the equilibrium step size of domestic innovation.
2.3 Foreign direct investment
After the domestic entrepreneurs complete their R&D projects and before
they sell their products, foreign rms may transfer recent technological de-
velopments from the world technology frontier to the developing country.
This transfer of foreign technologies via FDI is a random process. If the
process is successful in industry i, then the foreign rm takes away the mo-
nopolistic position from the domestic entrepreneur in that industry. Before
this process of technology transfer begins, the level of productivity in indus-
try i at time t is eAt(i) = (1+ t)At 1(i). If the technology transfer succeeds,
then productivity in industry i increases further to
bAt(i) = eAt(i) + gAt 1. (6)
At 1 is the level of technology at the world technology frontier at time t  1
and evolves according to
At = (1 + g
)At 1, (7)
where g is the exogenous growth rate of the world technology frontier.
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The expected value of a successful transfer of foreign technologies via FDI
in industry i is (1   ts) bAt(i), where t 2 [0; 1] is the probability that the
transferred technologies will be imitated by a domestic rm in which case the
foreign rm has to give away a share s 2 [0; 1] of the market to the domestic
imitator (to be discussed further below). To achieve a successful FDI project
with probability ft in industry i, the foreign rm has to devote Ft(i) units of
nal goods. For analytical simplicity, we consider a quadratic cost function
given by
Ft(i) =
(ft)
2
2f
bAt(i), (8)
where f is a productivity parameter. The expected prot of FDI is ft(1  
ts) bAt(i)   Ft(i). Simple di¤erentiation yields the equilibrium intensity of
FDI given by
ft = (1  ts)f 2 [0; 1] (9)
for i 2 [0; 1].17 Equation (9) shows that either a larger probability of imitation
t or a larger share s of the market to be given away to the imitator reduces
the incentives for technology transfer via FDI.
Proposition 2 A higher rate of imitation (i.e., a larger t) reduces the equi-
librium intensity of FDI.
2.4 Imitation and intellectual property rights
After the foreign rms complete their process of technology transfer, the
domestic economy consists of two types of industries that are occupied by
17A parameter condition (P1) to be stated below will ensure that ft < 1.
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either (a) domestic innovators or (b) foreign rms. In the case of (a), another
domestic individual is randomly chosen as an imitator, who has the ability
to adapt foreign technologies from other industries. We refer to this type of
imitation as e¢ cient imitation et.18 In the case of (b), a domestic individual
is randomly chosen as an imitator, who has the ability to imitate existing
foreign technologies in the industry. We refer to this type of imitation as
ine¢ cient imitation t.19 Both types of imitation are random. If the imita-
tion process is successful, then the imitator takes away (a) the monopolistic
position from the domestic innovator in the case of e¢ cient imitation et or
(b) some market share s 2 [0; 1] from the foreign rm in the case of ine¢ cient
imitation t. For s = 0, the imitator is unable to take away any market share
from the foreign rm. For s = 1, the imitator takes away the entire market
share from the foreign rm. The general case of s 2 (0; 1) captures the sce-
nario, in which the foreign rm and the domestic imitator collude and share
the monopolistic prot as in Segerstrom (1991). Under this general case, the
domestic imitator is able to take away some market share from the foreign
rm because domestic rms often have a competitive advantage over foreign
rms through local knowledge and local network in developing countries. For
example, Branstetter et al. (2006) note that when a foreign rm "...transfers
this knowledge to local employees, there is a risk that these employees will
defect to a local manufacturer, taking sensitive technology with them. These
employees are able to combine the patented and unpatented elements of the
rmstechnology, e¤ectively competing with it in the local market."
18We call this e¢ cient imitation because it raises the level of technology in the industry.
19We call this ine¢ cient imitation because it contributes nothing to the industrys level
of technology.
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The return to e¢ cient imitation is  bAt(i). To achieve an e¢ cient imita-
tion with probability et in industry i, the imitator has to devote Et(i) units
of nal goods to imitative R&D. Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost
function given by
Et(i) = t
(et)
2
2e
bAt(i), (10)
where e is a productivity parameter for e¢ cient imitation and t 2 (0;1) is
a policy variable determining the level of patent protection at time t. This
formulation captures the idea that a stronger system of patent protection
(i.e., a larger t) makes imitation more di¢ cult and potentially improves in-
tellectual appropriability by domestic innovators. The expected prot from
e¢ cient imitation is et bAt(i)  Et(i). Simple di¤erentiation yields the equi-
librium intensity of e¢ cient imitation given by
et = minfe=t; 1g (11)
for i 2 [0; 1].
The return to ine¢ cient imitation is s bAt(i). To achieve an ine¢ cient
imitation with probability t in industry i, the imitator has to devote It(i)
units of nal goods to imitative R&D. Again, we consider a simple quadratic
cost function given by
It(i) = t
(t)
2
2
bAt(i), (12)
where  is a productivity parameter for ine¢ cient imitation. This formula-
tion captures the idea that a stronger system of patent protection makes the
imitation of foreign technologies more di¢ cult and improves intellectual ap-
propriability by foreign rms. The expected prot is ts bAt(i) It(i). Simple
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di¤erentiation yields the equilibrium t given by
t = minfs=t; 1g (13)
for i 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 3 A stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t)
reduces both types of imitation.
Proposition 3 shows that stronger patent protection reduces e¢ cient and
ine¢ cient imitation. The reduction in ine¢ cient imitation increases foreign
technology transfer via FDI from Proposition 2. As for domestic innovation,
stronger patent protection has a direct positive e¤ect by reducing e¢ cient
imitation and an indirect negative e¤ect by increasing FDI. In (5), the prob-
ability pt is given by ft+(1 ft)et. In other words, at the time of innovation,
a domestic innovator may be subsequently displaced by a foreign rm with
probability ft or by a domestic imitator with probability (1   ft)et. Di¤er-
entiating pt = ft + (1  ft)et with respect to t yields
@pt
@t
= (1  et) @ft
@t
>0
+ (1  ft) @et
@t
<0
. (14)
Equation (14) shows that a larger t increases pt through ft (i.e., the dis-
placement e¤ect of foreign technologies) and decreases pt through et (i.e., the
direct e¤ect of reducing domestic imitation). Applying (9), (11) and (13),
we nd that
@pt
@t
< 0() t > 1
2s

s2
e
  1  f
f

. (15)
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Recall that domestic innovation t is decreasing in pt from Proposition 1.
Therefore, if and only if (15) holds, then patent strength t would have a
monotonically positive e¤ect on domestic innovation t. In other words, for a
su¢ ciently small t (or equivalently, a su¢ ciently large t), it is possible for
@t=@t to become negative (i.e., @pt=@t > 0) implying an inverted-U e¤ect
of t on domestic innovation t. The negative e¤ect of patent protection on
domestic innovation arises from the displacement e¤ect of foreign technology
transfer via FDI.
For a developing country, it is unlikely that the level of patent protection
has reached this level.20 Therefore, we impose the following su¢ cient condi-
tion to ensure that @t=@t > 0 for t 2 (0;1). This parameter condition
is given by
f <
1
(1 + s2=e)
, (P1)
which in turn implies f < 1=.21 For the rest of the analysis, we assume that
(P1) holds.
Proposition 4 Given (P1), a stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a
larger t) has a positive e¤ect on domestic innovation in the developing
country.
20See for example Park (2008b) for a survey of empirical studies on patent strength and
innovation. Upon surveying the empirical literature, Park (2008b) concludes that although
an inverted-U e¤ect of patent strength on innovation is theoretically plausible, empirical
evidence seems to suggest that the level of patent protection in most countries is still on
the upward-sloping side of the curve.
21This condition is su¢ cient for ft < 1 in (9).
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2.5 Aggregation
At the beginning of time t, the level of technology is industry i is At 1(i).
Then, the domestic innovator increases the level of technology to eAt(i). After
that, if either a foreign rm or a domestic imitator succeeds in transferring
foreign technologies into industry i, then the level of technology would further
increase to bAt(i). The transfer of foreign technologies succeeds with prob-
ability ft while the e¢ cient imitation of foreign technologies succeeds with
probability et. Using the law of large numbers, we derive the following law
of motion for aggregate technology At 
R
At(i)di in the developing country.
At = [ft + (1  ft)et]gAt 1 + (1 + t)At 1. (16)
Intuitively, (16) states that the industries experience an average productivity
improvement by tAt 1 through domestic innovation and a fraction ft+(1 
ft)et of the industries experiences an additional productivity improvement
by gAt 1 through either FDI or e¢ cient imitation.
The aggregate production function can be obtained by substituting Pt(i) =
1= and (2) into (1) to derive
Yt = At, (17)
where   2=(1 ) is a composite parameter. The resource constraint for
nal goods is
Yt = Ct +Xt +Rt + Et + It + Ft +NXt, (18)
where (a) Ct is aggregate consumption, (b) Xt is the total amount of nal
goods used in the production of intermediate goods, (c) Rt is aggregate in-
novative R&D, (d) Et is aggregate expenditure on e¢ cient imitation, (e) It
19
is aggregate expenditure on ine¢ cient imitation, (f) Ft is aggregate expen-
diture on FDI, and (g) NXt is net export that is equal to the monopolistic
prot (net of FDI expenditure) captured by foreign rms. Using Pt(i) = 1=
and (2), we obtain
Xt = 
2=(1 )At. (19)
From (4), aggregate innovative R&D is
Rt =
(t)


At 1. (20)
From (10), aggregate expenditure on e¢ cient imitation is
Et = (1  ft)t (et)
2
2e
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (21)
From (12), aggregate expenditure on ine¢ cient imitation is
It = ftt
(t)
2
2
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (22)
From (8), aggregate expenditure on FDI is
Ft =
(ft)
2
2f
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (23)
As for the net export of nal goods, it is given by
NXt =

ft(1  ts)   (ft)
2
2f

[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (24)
Finally, aggregate consumption is
Ct = (1  2)At   (Rt + Et + It + Ft +NXt). (25)
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2.6 Convergence
If we dene at  At=At as an inverse measure of the developing countrys
distance to the world technology frontier, then the law of motion for at is
at = [ft + (1  ft)et]

g
1 + g

+

1 + t
1 + g

at 1  H(at 1). (26)
Equation (26) is plotted in Figure 1 for a constant value of .
Figure 1 - Convergence and Distance to Frontier
In this case, at converges to a unique steady-state value given by
a =
f + (1  f)e
1  =g . (27)
To ensure that a 2 (0; 1), we naturally assume
g >

1  p =
()1=( 1)
(1  p)( 2)=( 1) , (P2)
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where p = f + (1   f)e. At the steady state, the developing country grows
at the same rate as the world technology frontier despite the fact that the
step size of domestic innovation  is smaller than g. However, if the devel-
oping country fails to obtain foreign technologies (i.e., f = e = 0), then it
would diverge from the rest of the world because domestic innovation alone
is insu¢ cient for the country to catch up with the world technology frontier.
Furthermore, (27) shows that stronger patent protection has opposing e¤ects
on the steady-state level of distance to frontier. On the one hand, a larger 
stimulates domestic innovation  and FDI f implying a positive e¤ect on a.
On the other hand, it discourages e¢ cient imitation e implying a negative
e¤ect on a.
3 Stage-dependent IPR protection
The growth rate of technology in the developing country at time t is
gt  At
At 1
  1 = pt g

at 1
+ t, (28)
where pt = ft + (1  ft)et. This equation shows that for a backward country
(i.e., a small at 1), obtaining foreign technologies through pt (i.e., FDI and
e¢ cient imitation) is relatively important for achieving a higher growth rate.
In contrast, for an advanced country (i.e., a large at 1), domestic innovation
t becomes relatively important. Di¤erentiating (28) with respect to pt yields
@gt
@pt
=
g
at 1
  ()
1=( 1)
(   1)(1  pt)( 2)=( 1) , (29)
@2gt
@p2t
=   ()
1=( 1)(   2)
(   1)2(1  pt)1+( 2)=( 1) < 0. (30)
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The second-order condition implies that the growth rate gt in the developing
country is globally concave in pt, whereas the rst-order condition implies a
growth-maximizing pgt given by
pgt = 1 

()1=( 1)
g(   1) at 1
( 1)=( 2)
2 (0; 1), (31)
which is decreasing in at 1 and increasing in g. To see that p
g
t > 0 for any
at 1 < 1,
g >
()1=( 1)
(1  p)( 2)=( 1) >
()1=( 1)
(   1) >
()1=( 1)
(   1) at 1, (32)
where the rst inequality follows from (P2), and the second inequality follows
from 1  p < (   1)( 1)=( 2), where  > 2.
Because pt = ft + (1   ft)et 2 [f; 1], the following parameter condition
ensures that there exists a value of t 2 (0;1) that equates pt = pgt .
f <
pgt

. (P3)
In other words, the growth-maximizing pgt can be mapped into a unique
level of growth-maximizing patent strength gt that is increasing in at 1
because pt is monotonically decreasing in t given (P1). Intuitively, the
growth-maximizing level of patent protection increases as the developing
country evolves toward the world technology frontier. This nding of a stage-
dependent growth-maximizing patent protection is driven by the property
that the relative importance between foreign technologies and domestic in-
novation on the developing countrys growth rate changes endogenously as it
evolves towards the world technology frontier. Also, it is interesting to note
that in the case of an increase in g, pgt increases and 
g
t decreases for a given
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at 1. Intuitively, when the technology frontier grows at a faster rate, it is
more e¢ cient for the developing country to imitate foreign technologies than
to invest in domestic innovation by implementing a weaker patent system.
Proposition 5 As a developing country evolves towards the world technol-
ogy frontier, the growth-maximizing patent strength increases overtime. In
addition, for a given stage of development, the growth-maximizing patent
strength is decreasing in the growth rate of frontier technology.
As for the welfare-maximizing patent strength, we consider a government
that chooses t as a function of at 1 to maximize aggregate welfare of cur-
rent and future individuals given by
P1
t=1 
t 1Ut, where Ut 
R
ujtdj. The
assumption of risk neutrality implies that aggregate welfare of individuals at
time t is simply given by aggregate consumption at time t (i.e., Ut = Ct).
Substituting (20) - (24) into (25) yields
Ct = [(1 2)pt t]gAt 1+

(1  2)  (t)

(1 + t)
  t

(1+t)At 1,
(33)
where t  (1  ft)t(et)2=(2e) + ftt(t)2=(2) + ft(1  ts). The govern-
ments objective is
max
t
1X
t=1
t 1Ct = A0max
t
1X
t=1
[(1 + g)]t 1 ct, (34)
where ct  Ct=At 1. Using (33), we can rearrange terms to obtain
ct = [(1 2)pt t]g+

(1  2)  (t)

(1 + t)
  t

(1+t)at 1. (35)
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Given (34) and (35), we can solve for the socially optimal policy as a
time-invariant dynamic programming, using the following Bellman equation.
v(at 1) = max
t
ct + (1 + g
)v(at), (36)
where the law of motion for at is given by (26). Substituting (26) and (35) into
(36), we derive an expression only in at 1, parameters, and policy variable
t. Given the analytical complexity of this problem, we consider a numerical
approach (described in Appendix A) to solve for the welfare-maximizing path
of patent strength ut . All the simulations we have obtained so far conrm
that ut is strictly increasing in at 1. Hence, these numerical simulations
indicate that our theoretical prediction on the growth-maximizing policy also
applies to the welfare-maximizing policy.
Proposition 6 For a wide range of parameters, we nd that the welfare-
maximizing patent strength ut is increasing in at 1.
In Figure 2, we show a typical simulation outcome, obtained using the
following parameter values:  = 0:8, f = 1, { = 1, e = 1,  = 0:30,  = 0:03,
 = 3, s = 0:5, and g = 0:05. As at 1 increases, the optimal IPR policy
ut (at 1) also increases.
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Figure 2 - Optimal IPR Policy
4 Empirical evidence
The theoretical nding of stage-dependent IPR protection is consistent with
the empirical pattern of patent rights. Figure 3 plots the Ginarte-Park index
of patent rights for a large number of countries at various points in time
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against their labor productivity relative to the US (i.e., US Relative Produc-
tivity is normalized to one). The Ginarte-Park index is available from 1960
to 2005 with one observation every 5 years for each country. To avoid reverse
causality and to average out business cycles, we plot the Ginarte-Park in-
dex in any given year (e.g., 2005) against the average Relative Productivity
from the previous 4 years (e.g., 2001 to 2004). Hence we have 120 countries
each with a time series of up to length 10. The graph shows a clear pattern:
countries that are closer to the world technology frontier implement stronger
patent rights.
Figure 3 - Patent Protection and Distance to Frontier
To provide a formal statistical test on this empirical relationship, we
regress the Ginarte-Park index on Relative Productivity (i.e., the inverse
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of distance to frontier) and control for time and country xed e¤ects. The
regression results are reported in Table 1, in which we see that the inverse of
distance to frontier has a positive and signicant e¤ect on the patent index.
The Likelihood Ratio tests performed show that the (country, time, and
combined) xed e¤ects are all statistically signicant at the 1% signicance
level.22
constant 1.715*** (40.93) 1.056*** (12.55) 1.849*** (11.99)
relative productivity 1.711*** (18.56) 1.799*** (26.65) 0.815*** (5.09)
1965 No 0.128 (1.23) 0.112* (1.70)
1970 No 0.188* (1.82) 0.161** (2.48)
1975 No 0.134 (1.32) 0.152** (2.34)
1980 No 0.259** (2.56) 0.300*** (4.58)
1985 No 0.321*** (3.20) 0.367*** (5.62)
1990 No 0.425*** (4.25) 0.467*** (7.23)
1995 No 0.978*** (9.84) 1.025*** (15.96)
2000 No 1.448*** (14.67) 1.490*** (23.42)
2005 No 1.758*** (17.76) 1.791*** (28.15)
country fixed effects No No Yes
R2-adjusted 0.25 0.60 0.85
No. of observations 1026 1026 1026
F -statistics 344.63*** 155.49*** 44.44***
*** Statistically significant at 1%.
Student's t -test values are in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at 10%
** Statistically significant at 5%.
Table 1 - Regression Results
22Despite its limitations, also the Hausman Test rejects the insignicance of (only coun-
try, due to panel unbalancedness) cross-sectional xed e¤ects at the 8% signicance level.
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Even if panel data analysis is usually considered less at risk of spurious re-
gression (Baltagi, 2001, Hsiao, 2003), which is especially true here due to the
relatively large number of cross-sectional units, the presence of unit roots in
the level of the variables - the Ginarte-Park index and Relative Productivity -
has been tested. Regarding Relative Productivity, Levin, Lin, and Chus test
rejects a common unit root, but Im, Pesaran and Shins test, the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test, and the non-parametric Phillips-Perron tests for individ-
ual unit roots all accept the null hypothesis of individual unit roots. All tests
reject unit roots in the rst-di¤erenced variable. Regarding the Ginarte-Park
index, Levin, Lin, and Chus test rejects a common unit root, and Im, Pe-
saran and Shins test rejects the individual unit root hypothesis. However,
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the non-parametric Phillips-Perron
test for individual unit roots both accept the null hypothesis of individual
unit roots. All tests reject unit roots in both rst-di¤erenced variables.23
Despite non-stationarity, we have undertaken a dynamic panel general-
ized method of moment analysis, using Arellano-Bond 2-step procedure, but
the results, while providing a coe¢ cient of Relative Productivity equal to
0.612048 (signicant at less than 1%), also yield a coe¢ cient for the one
period lagged Ginarte-Park index equal to 1.175237 (signicant at less than
1%), which conrms instability.
Because both the Ginarte-Park index and Relative Productivity are I(1)
processes, we move on to undertake a battery of panel cointegration tests.
The data suggests the inclusion of a deterministic trend in the cointegration
23In all tests, we have considered Akaike, Schwartz, and Hannan-Quinn criteria for
selecting the correct lag lengths, without obtaining contradictory results.
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tests. As a result, all Kaos tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion at the 1% signicance level; 9 out of 11 of Pedronis cointegration tests
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% signicance level;
and all Johansen-based cointegration tests reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration at the 1% signicance level.24
Undertaking the Johansen cointegrated VAR analysis also leads to a pos-
itive and signicant coe¢ cient of Relative Productivity in the unique cointe-
grating relationship found, though its value of around 3 is higher than that of
the other estimations undertaken. Nevertheless, we can safely conclude this
section by saying that despite all limitations of our data set, there appears
to be robust evidence of a positive relationship between Relative Productiv-
ity and the Ginarte-Park index of patent rights. This empirical nding is
consistent with our main theoretical result: as a country evolves towards the
world technology frontier, its patent strength increases overtime.
5 Discussion
In this study, we have developed a simple Schumpeterian growth model of
distance to frontier to analyze the evolution of IPR protection in developing
countries. Although our model is stylized, we believe that it captures the
essence of the key issue that is the interrelation between economic develop-
ment and optimal IPR protection. Specically, an appropriate IPR system
contributes to the economic development of a country, which in turn deter-
24We have performed our empirical analysis using EViews. Data and intermediate
software-generated tables are available upon request.
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mines the optimal level of IPR protection in the country at a given stage of its
development. In summary, we nd that the optimal strength of IPR protec-
tion increases as a developing country evolves towards the world technology
frontier, and this theoretical nding of stage-dependent IPR protection is
consistent with the historical evolution of the IPR system in China and also
supported by empirical evidence.
Finally, in the theoretical model, we consider a developing country that
takes the world technology frontier as given. Although it is arguable that
technological progress in developed countries may be a¤ected by the level
of IPR protection in developing countries, it is still an open debate among
existing studies (cited in the introduction) as to whether Southern IPR pro-
tection has a positive or negative e¤ect on Northern innovation. Therefore,
we leave this important but controversial issue to future research.
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Not for publication
Appendix A: Numerical solution of the optimal IPR policy
Recall that the governments objective is
max
t
1X
t=1
t 1Ct = A0max
t
1X
t=1
[(1 + g)]t 1 ct,
where ct is given by (35). Given the analytical complexity of this problem,
we consider a numerical approach to solve for the welfare-maximizing path
of patent strength. In our numerical analysis, we simulate numerically the
value function, v(at 1), and the policy function G(at 1)  t, adopting a
standard value-function iteration method, according to which25:
1. We select a grid of points26 for [0; 1], i.e. the state space of ai, where
now i 2 1; :::; N indexes the i-th point in the grid (not time);
2. We start from an initial guess27 of v0(a);
3. We obtain numerical solutions for
v1i = max
i
ci + (1 + g
)v0(ai)
for all i 2 1; :::; N ;
4. We obtain a (cubic) polynomial spline approximation of v1(a) such
that v1(ai) = v1i;
25All computations have been performed using Matlab. The .m les used are available
upon request from the authors.
26This number is N = 40 in our simulations.
27Identically equal to zero.
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5. We iterate this procedure, this time starting from the new function
v1(ai), obtaining
v2i = max
i
ci + (1 + g
)v1(ai)
for all i 2 1; :::; N ;
6. Obtain a polynomial spline approximation of v2(a) such that v2(ai) =
v2i: this is necessary for the maximization to take place in the continuous
space [0; 1], thereby admitting solutions for i corresponding to values of a
not necessarily in the chosen grid28;
7. We keep repeating the maximization and approximation, until the
change in vni and in the policy variables does not exceed a tolerance value29.
28Otherwise v1(ai) would not be dened.
29of 10 4, and the number of iterations do not exceed a maximum number of loops, set
equal to 80 in our simulations.
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